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A PHP encryption toolkit for secure front-end to back-end communication.
In real-world development, API endpoints often require security: data needs encryption to prevent sniffing, and requests must be protected from tampering and replay attacks. Coordinating encryption methods and signature rules with the front-end can be tedious. This package, paired with the front-end npm package, lets the front-end generate encrypted request parameters with a single call, while the back-end decrypts and verifies in just a few lines of code.
Front-end companion npm package: npm-encrypted-request
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- 🔐 Hybrid encryption: AES-256-GCM symmetric encryption + RSA-OAEP asymmetric encryption. AES keys are randomly generated by the front-end and transmitted via RSA public key encryption — the back-end only needs the RSA private key
- ✍️ HMAC-SHA256 signature verification: Prevents request parameters from being tampered with
- ⏰ Timestamp validation: Second-level verification with configurable tolerance to prevent request replay
- 🔑 Nonce anti-replay: One-time random number mechanism to block duplicate requests
- ⚙️ Flexible configuration: Supports
.envfiles, inline arrays, or custom.envpaths - 🧩 Extensible: Pluggable Nonce validator (Redis, APCu, etc.) for production environments
composer require hejunjie/encrypted-requestVia .env file:
RSA_PRIVATE_KEY=your-private-key
SIGN_SECRET=your-sign-secret
DEFAULT_TIMESTAMP_DIFF=60
NONCE_TTL=300Or via an array:
$config = [
'RSA_PRIVATE_KEY' => 'your-private-key', // RSA private key (including -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----)
'SIGN_SECRET' => 'your-sign-secret', // HMAC-SHA256 signing key
'DEFAULT_TIMESTAMP_DIFF' => 60, // Timestamp tolerance in seconds, default 60
'NONCE_TTL' => 300, // Nonce TTL in seconds, default 300
];use Hejunjie\EncryptedRequest\EncryptedRequestHandler;
use Hejunjie\EncryptedRequest\Contracts\NonceValidatorInterface;
$params = $_POST; // Obtain front-end request parameters
// EncryptedRequestHandler constructor:
// __construct(array|string $config = '', int $protocolVersion = 1, ?NonceValidatorInterface $nonceValidator = null)
//
// - First argument: config array, .env file path, or omit (auto-detect .env)
// - Second argument: Protocol version — defaults to 1
// - Third argument: Nonce validator — defaults to in-memory implementation (testing only!)
$handler = new EncryptedRequestHandler($config); // Omit first argument if using .env
try {
$data = $handler->handle(
$params['en_data'] ?? '',
$params['enc_payload'] ?? '',
(int)($params['timestamp'] ?? 0),
$params['sign'] ?? ''
);
// $data is the decrypted array
} catch (\Hejunjie\EncryptedRequest\Exceptions\SignatureException $e) {
// Invalid signature
} catch (\Hejunjie\EncryptedRequest\Exceptions\TimestampException $e) {
// Timestamp out of range
} catch (\Hejunjie\EncryptedRequest\Exceptions\NonceException $e) {
// Nonce already used (replay attack)
} catch (\Hejunjie\EncryptedRequest\Exceptions\DecryptionException $e) {
// RSA or AES decryption failed
}Warning
Without the third argument, the default InMemoryNonceValidator stores nonces in process memory, which is lost after each PHP request — it cannot truly prevent replay attacks. Always pass a custom Nonce validator in production. See the "Custom Nonce Validator" section below.
| Config | Type | Required | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
RSA_PRIVATE_KEY |
string | ✅ | - | RSA private key for decrypting the AES key from the front-end |
SIGN_SECRET |
string | ✅ | - | HMAC-SHA256 signing key, must match the front-end |
DEFAULT_TIMESTAMP_DIFF |
int | ❌ | 60 |
Timestamp tolerance in seconds |
NONCE_TTL |
int | ❌ | 300 |
Nonce time-to-live in seconds |
Signature Verification → Timestamp Check → RSA Decrypt (AES Key) → Nonce Anti-Replay → AES-256-GCM Decrypt
- Signature verification (runs first): HMAC-SHA256 over
en_data + enc_payload + timestampusingSIGN_SECRET. Invalid requests are rejected immediately. - Timestamp check: Ensures the request timestamp is within the configured tolerance.
- RSA decryption: Decrypts
enc_payloadwith the RSA private key to obtain the AES key, IV, and Nonce. - Nonce verification: Checks whether the Nonce has been used before, preventing replay attacks.
- AES-256-GCM decryption: Decrypts the request data using the extracted AES key and IV.
The front-end uses the hejunjie-encrypted-request npm package to generate encrypted data:
import { encryptRequest, EncryptOptions } from "hejunjie-encrypted-request";
const options: EncryptOptions = {
data: { message: "Hello" },
rsaPublicKey: pubKey,
signSecret: signSecret,
};
const payload = await encryptRequest(options, version);The PHP back-end can then decrypt directly using EncryptedRequestHandler.
The default InMemoryNonceValidator stores nonces in process memory and is only suitable for single-process or testing environments. For production, implement the NonceValidatorInterface (e.g., with Redis, APCu, or a database) and pass it as the third argument to the EncryptedRequestHandler constructor:
use Hejunjie\EncryptedRequest\EncryptedRequestHandler;
use Hejunjie\EncryptedRequest\Contracts\NonceValidatorInterface;
// 1. Implement NonceValidatorInterface
class RedisNonceValidator implements NonceValidatorInterface
{
private \Redis $redis;
public function __construct(\Redis $redis)
{
$this->redis = $redis;
}
public function verify(string $nonce, int $ttl): bool
{
// Use SET NX EX for atomic check-and-set
return $this->redis->set("nonce:{$nonce}", 1, ['nx', 'ex' => $ttl]) === true;
}
}
// 2. Inject as the third argument (using named parameter)
$handler = new EncryptedRequestHandler(
$config, // First argument: config
nonceValidator: new RedisNonceValidator($redis) // Third argument: custom Nonce validator
);src/
├── Config/
│ └── EnvConfigLoader.php # Configuration loader (.env + array)
├── Contracts/
│ ├── DecryptorInterface.php # Decryptor interface
│ └── NonceValidatorInterface.php # Nonce validator interface
├── Drivers/
│ ├── AesDecryptor.php # AES-256-GCM decryptor
│ ├── InMemoryNonceValidator.php # In-memory Nonce validator (default, testing only)
│ └── RsaDecryptor.php # RSA-OAEP decryptor
├── Exceptions/
│ ├── DecryptionException.php # Decryption exception
│ ├── NonceException.php # Nonce exception (replay attack)
│ ├── SignatureException.php # Signature exception
│ └── TimestampException.php # Timestamp exception
└── EncryptedRequestHandler.php # Core handler
- PHP >= 8.0
- Requires PHP OpenSSL extension
- Works with any PSR-4 autoloading framework or vanilla PHP project
No. InMemoryNonceValidator stores data in process memory, which is lost after each PHP request — it cannot reliably prevent replay attacks. For production, inject a Redis or database-backed implementation as shown in the "Custom Nonce Validator" section above.
The SIGN_SECRET value must exactly match the signSecret parameter passed to encryptRequest() on the front-end. Store the key in .env and sync it to the front-end through a secure channel.
Any project following PSR-4 autoloading, including but not limited to Laravel, Symfony, Slim, ThinkPHP, and plain PHP projects.
Issues and pull requests are welcome.