fix(audit): recursive redaction for nested maps and inlined secrets (PILOT-304)

[matthew-pilot]

What

BuildEntry previously only redacted top-level attribute keys via redactKey(). If an attribute value was:

• A map[string]interface{} with nested secret keys (e.g. config={token=sk-abc})
• A string containing embedded secrets (e.g. stringified JSON, key=value pairs)

…the secrets landed verbatim in the audit log.

Fix

• formatVal — dispatches to recursive map-walker or string-scanner based on value type
• formatMap — recursively walks maps, redacting secret keys at any depth
• scanSecrets — scans string values for known secret patterns (token=, "token":") and replaces values with <redacted>

Scope

 audit/audit.go             | 113 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 audit/zz_redaction_test.go |  53 ++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 158 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

Verification

• go build ./... ✓
• go vet ./... ✓
• Full test suite (18 packages): all pass ✓
• New tests cover: nested map redaction, deeply nested map redaction, JSON string scanning, key=value string scanning, clean-string no-op

Ticket

Closes PILOT-304: audit redaction — only top-level keys checked, nested values bypass

[codecov]

Codecov Report

✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests.

📢 Thoughts on this report? Let us know!

[matthew-pilot]

📊 PR Status — #27 PILOT-304

Field	Value
State	OPEN
Mergeable	✅ MERGEABLE (CLEAN)
Draft	No
Branch	openclaw/pilot-304-20260530-191046 → main
Files	2 files, +158/−8 (audit/audit.go, audit/zz_redaction_test.go)
Labels	matthew-fix-larger

CI Checks (2/2 passing)

Check	Result
test	✅ pass
codecov/patch	✅ pass

Canary

🧪 Running — dispatched run 26692500596, pending completion.

Jira

PILOT-304 — QA/IN-REVIEW (unassigned). Updated: 2026-05-30T22:11 EEST.

Last operator activity

PR created by matthew-pilot at 19:11 UTC. No operator activity yet.

[matthew-pilot]

🔍 PR Explanation — #27 PILOT-304

What this does

Extends audit entry redaction from top-level keys only to recursive deep inspection: nested maps, deeply-nested maps, and inline secrets embedded in string values (e.g. JSON blobs or key=value pairs).

The problem

The existing redactKey() check only looked at the top-level attrs slice passed to BuildEntry. If an operator logged a config map like {"host":"x","token":"sk-secret"}, the token appeared unredacted in the audit log. Similarly, a raw JSON string like {"api_key":"sk-emb"} in an env value would leak its secret because the scanner didnt look inside string values.

Walkthrough: 2 files (+158/−8)

audit/audit.go (+105/−8)

1. BuildEntry refactored (line 277): switches from string concatenation to strings.Builder. Calls new formatVal(k, v) instead of inline redaction — delegates all formatting and redaction to the new recursive pipeline.

2. formatVal(k, v) — top-level dispatcher:

   • If key matches redactKey() → <redacted> (unchanged behavior).
   • If value is map[string]interface{} → delegates to formatMap (recursive).
   • If value is string → runs through scanSecrets (new: inline secret scanning).
   • Otherwise → fmt.Sprintf("%v") as before.

3. formatMap(prefix, m) — recursive map walker:

   • Formats as prefix={k1=v1, k2=v2, ...}.
   • For each key: redacts if secret, recurses into nested maps, scans string values.

4. scanSecrets(s) — string value scanner:

   • Scans for secret-key prefixes embedded in string values (JSON "token":"...", key=value pairs, etc.).
   • Replaces the value portion with <redacted>.
   • Uses substring matching (no regex dependency).

5. findValueEnd(s) — value boundary detector:

   • Stops at first whitespace, comma, quote, or newline after a secret key prefix.

6. secretKeyPrefixes — pattern list:

   • admin_token, private_key, api_key, signature, token, password, passwd, secret, bearer, credential
   • Both JSON ("key":") and plain (key=) formats. Longer prefixes first to avoid partial matches.

audit/zz_redaction_test.go (+53/−0) — 5 new test cases:

• Nested map with token → redacted
• Deeply nested map (2 levels) → redacted
• Stringified JSON with embedded token → scanned and redacted
• key=value string with api_key=sk-kv → scanned and redacted
• Clean string (host=ex.com) → untouched

Why this approach

• Zero new dependencies — substring matching, no regex. Keeps the audit package dependency surface small.
• Recursive by construction — any nesting depth works because formatMap calls formatVal which can call formatMap.
• Backward-compatible — top-level redactKey() behavior is unchanged. The new code adds deeper scanning alongside the existing check.

[matthew-pilot]

📊 PR Status — #27 PILOT-304

Field	Value
PR	OPEN · MERGEABLE ✅
CI	2/2 passing (test ✅, codecov/patch ✅)
Labels	matthew-fix-larger, canary-failed 🔴
Reviews	0 reviews
Created	2026-05-30 (4 days old)

⚠️ Canary Failed

The canary harness reported a failure for this PR. Do not merge until resolved. See the canary run for details.

🤖 Auto-check

Self-created PR by matthew-pilot. Awaiting operator review. No operator activity detected.

---

matthew-pr-worker tick 2026-06-03T20:53 UTC

[TeoSlayer]

Superseded by clean-rebase replacement.